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The predictability of the market return and dividend growth is addressed in an equilibrium model with
two regimes. A state variable that drives the conditional means of the aggregate consumption and dividend
growth rates follows different time-series processes in the two regimes. In linear predictive regressions
over 1930-2009, the market return is predictable by the price-dividend ratio with R2 11.7% if the probability
of being in the first regime exceeds 50%; and dividend growth is predictable by the price-dividend
ratio with R2 28.3% if the probability of being in the second regime exceeds 50%. The model-implied
state variables perform significantly better at predicting the equity, size, and value premia, the aggregate
consumption and dividend growth rates, and the variance of the market return than linear regressions
with the market price-dividend ratio and risk free rate as predictive variables.
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Stock return predictability has for long been the subject of both theoretical and empir-
ical research in ￿nancial economics. Attempts to predict the aggregate stock market
return have a long history in ￿nance going back to as early as 1920 when Dow (1920)
explored the role of dividend ratios in predicting the market return. Over the last three
decades, the academic literature has explored numerous ￿nancial variables as potential
predictors of the market return and equity premium. The price-dividend ratio has re-
ceived extensive scrutiny as a predictive variable because, as a mathematical identity,
all variation in the price-dividend ratio must be accounted for by changing expecta-
tions on future returns and/or future dividend growth (Campbell and Shiller (1988)).
Welch and Goyal (2008) review this literature and undertake a comprehensive study of
the in-sample and out-of-sample performance of these variables in predicting the eq-
uity premium. They conclude that "by and large, these models have predicted poorly
both in-sample (IS) and out-of-sample (OOS) for 30 years now; these models seem un-
stable, as diagnosed by their out-of-sample predictions and other statistics; and these
models would not have helped an investor with access only to available information to
pro￿tably time the market." These conclusions are controversial.
Campbell and Thompson (2008) show that, when restrictions are imposed on the
theoretically expected sign of the regression coe¢ cient and the ￿tted value of the
equity premium, the out-of-sample R2 improves but is still small. However, they argue
that even a small value of R2 is economically meaningful for mean-variance investors.
Cochrane (2008) provides a defense of return predictability by arguing that return and
dividend growth predictability are intimately related and that the absence of dividend
growth predictability gives stronger evidence against the null that returns are not
predictable than does the presence of return predictability in the historical data.
In this paper, we shed light on this debate by arguing that there exist (at least)
two economic regimes. The market return is predictable by the price-dividend ratio in
the ￿rst regime; and the market dividend growth is predictable by the price-dividend
ratio in the second regime. We identify the regimes in the context of the dynamic
equilibrium asset pricing model with two regimes, proposed in Constantinides and
Ghosh (2009b). The probability that the economy is in the ￿rst regime is obtained
as a non-linear function of the market price-dividend ratio and risk free rate, with
parameters estimated from the Euler equations of the market return, the risk free
rate, and the cross-section of size and book-to-market equity-sorted portfolio returns
plus unconditional moments of the consumption and dividend processes. Furthermore,
this non-linearity cannot be captured by simple nonlinear functions like a quadratic
function of the market price-dividend ratio and risk free rate.
Over the period 1930 ￿ 2009, in all years when the probability of being in the ￿rst
regime exceeds 50%, in-sample linear predictive regressions of the realized one-year real
market return and realized real dividend growth on the lagged log price-dividend ratio
2have (adjusted) R
2
11:7% for the market return and negative R
2
for dividend growth.
By contrast, in the second regime, the R
2
for the market return is only 0:2% and
for dividend growth is 28:3%. We also ￿nd that the equity premium and the returns
on portfolios of ￿Small￿ , ￿Large￿ , ￿Growth￿ , and ￿Value￿stocks are predictable by
the market-wide price-dividend ratio in the ￿rst regime (when dividend growth is not
predictable) with statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients and R
2
varying from 3:1% for
the "Small" portfolio to 12:5% for the "Large" portfolio. The price-dividend ratio
performs poorly at predicting returns (except the return on "Small" stocks) in the
second regime with the R
2
varying from ￿3:1% for the "Large" portfolio to 1:5% for
the "Value" portfolio.
In the model, a state variable xt that simultaneously drives the conditional means
of the aggregate consumption and dividend growth rates reverts to its unconditional
mean with a process that di⁄ers across two regimes. Based on his information set, the
consumer observes xt and also calculates the posterior probability, pt, that the economy
is in the ￿rst regime. The conditional means of the aggregate consumption and dividend
growth rates are a¢ ne functions of the two state variables (xt; pt). The market-wide
log price-dividend ratio and risk free rate are approximately a¢ ne functions of (xt; pt)
and their product, thereby rendering the (potentially latent) state variables and the
expected return of each asset class known nonlinear functions of the price-dividend
ratio and risk free rate. The model parameters are estimated from the Euler equations
of the market return, the risk free rate, and the cross-section of size and book-to-
market-equity sorted portfolio returns plus unconditional moments of the consumption
and dividend processes.
We show that the model has superior in-sample forecasting performance for the
equity premium and its variance relative to a linear forecasting model with the market-
wide price-dividend ratio and risk free rate as predictive variables. Moreover, unlike
linear forecasting regressions with the price-dividend ratio and risk free rate as predic-
tive variables, the model-implied state variables have robust forecasting performance
across subperiods.
While most of the predictability literature focuses on predicting the aggregate US
stock market return and equity premium, the literature on the time series forecasta-
bility of the cross-section of size and book-to-market-equity sorted portfolio returns
is scant. Forecastability of the cross-section of returns is important for at least two
reasons. First, the historical size premium (9:4%) and value premium (7:3%) are of the
same order of magnitude as the equity premium (7:9%), based on arithmetic annual
returns. Therefore, the predictability of these premia is important in active portfolio
management. Second, it is also important in providing an alternative channel to exam-
ine the empirical plausibility of a given set of state variables that purport to explain the
cross-section of returns. We show that the model has superior forecasting performance
for the size and value premia relative to the linear forecasting model that is robust
3across subperiods.
Finally, we demonstrate that our model retains its predictive power out-of-sample.
We examine the out-of-sample predictive performance of the model in two ways. First,
we show that the model-implied state variables give an out-of-sample R2 of 5:1% for the
equity premium and 10:1% for the market return over the period 1976￿2009. Second,
we use the central insight of the model of changing economic regimes that makes the
equity premium and market return predictable by the market-wide price-dividend ratio
in the ￿rst regime but not in the second regime. This procedure gives out-of-sample
R2 of 7:3% and 9:1%, respectively, for the equity premium and market return. When
used as predictive variables in a linear predictive model, the price-dividend ratio and
risk free rate have poor predictive performance giving out-of-sample R2 of ￿1:6% and
￿2:5%, respectively, for the equity premium and market return.
Our paper is related to equilibrium models by Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010),
Bansal and Yaron (2004), Drechsler (2009), Hansen, Heaton and Li (2008), Lettau
and Ludvigson (2001), and Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi (2004) with implications on
forecasting the market return and dividend growth.
Our paper is also related to Brandt and Kang (2004), Koijen and Van Binsbergen
(2009), Pastor and Stambaugh (2009), and Rytchkov (2007), who focus on return
predictability using ￿ltering techniques. While these are reduced form models, we rely
on an equilibrium model and avoid using ￿ltering techniques by arguing that, under
the model assumptions, the (potentially latent) state variables and the expected return
of each asset class are known nonlinear functions of observable ￿nancial variables like
the price-dividend ratio and risk free rate.
Finally, our work is related to Lettau and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008), Pastor and
Stambaugh (2001), and Paye and Timmermann (2006) who ￿nd evidence of structural
breaks and argue that allowing for these breaks has important implications for return
predictability.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the regime shifts model.
We express the price-dividend ratio, risk free rate, and expected equity premium as
functions of the state variables (xt, pt). The annual data over the period 1930￿2009 are
discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we estimate the model parameters by GMM from
the set of the Euler equations for the market return, the risk free rate, and portfolios
of "Small", "Large", "Growth" and "Value" stocks, and the unconditional moments
of the consumption and dividend growth processes. Using the point estimates of the
model parameters, we invert the expressions for the price-dividend ratio and risk free
rate as functions of the state variables and express the state variables as functions of
the price-dividend ratio and risk free rate.
Armed with the time series of the state variables, we address the questions raised
in this paper. Section 5 presents empirical evidence that the predictability of returns
and dividend growth di⁄er signi￿cantly in the two-regimes. In Section 6, we present
evidence on the in-sample and out-of-sample predictability of the equity, size, and value
4premia. In Section 7, we present evidence on the predictability of the variance of the
market return. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model and Implications for Predictability
We consider the regime shift model proposed in Constantinides and Ghosh (2009b).
Here we provide a brief discussion of the model and its implications for the predictabil-
ity of the equity premium, size premium, value premium, consumption growth, and
dividend growth (see Constantinides and Ghosh (2009b) for further details).
2.1 Model
The model stipulates that the state variable, xt, that simultaneously drives the con-
ditional means of the aggregate consumption and dividend growth rates reverts to its
unconditional mean with a process that di⁄ers across two regimes:
xt+1 = ￿st+1xt + ’e￿st+1et+1, (1)
￿ct+1 = ￿ + xt + ￿st+1￿t+1, (2)
￿dt+1 = ￿d + ￿xt + ’d￿st+1ut+1, (3)
where ct+1 is the logarithm of the aggregate consumption level; dt+1 is the logarithm
of the aggregate stock market dividends; and st = 0;1 is a second state variable that
denotes the economic regime. The persistence parameter, ￿st, of the state variable xt
and the level of its volatility, ￿st, are generally di⁄erent in the two regimes. The shocks
et+1, ￿t+1, and ut+1 are assumed to be distributed with mean 0 and variance 1 and
independent of the past.
Given his information set, z(t), the representative consumer observes xt and cal-
culates his subjective probability, pt, at time t of being in regime st = 0:
pt ￿ Prob(st = 0jz(t)) (4)
We do not take a stand on the content of the information set, z(t). In one extreme
case, it may be limited to the history of consumption, dividends, and past realizations
of x. In the other extreme case, it may include all publicly available information.
Furthermore, we do not take a stand on the optimality of the ￿lter that the consumer
applies to form his belief, pt. The econometrician does not directly observe the state
variables, pt and xt, and, hence, they are latent.




￿0 1 ￿ ￿1
1 ￿ ￿0 ￿1
￿
, (5)
5where 0 < ￿i < 1 for i = 0;1. Thus, the consumer￿ s probability of being in regime
st+1 = 0 at time t + 1, given his information set, z(t), is
Prob(st+1 = 0jz(t)) = ￿0pt + (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ pt) ￿ f(pt). (6)
Note that 0 < f(pt) < 1 for all pt, 0 ￿ pt ￿ 1.
Once the consumer updates his information set at time t + 1, his probability of
being in regime st+1 = 0 at time t + 1 is pt+1 ￿ Prob(st+1 = 0jz(t + 1)). We assume
that the consumer￿ s expectations are unbiased in that
pt+1 = f(pt) + "t+1, (7)
where E ["t+1jz(t)] = 0.
We make the following assumptions regarding the shocks ￿t+1, ut+1, et+1, and "t+1:
E [yt+1jz(t);st+1 = 0] = E [yt+1jst+1 = 0] ￿ y(0), a constant, (8)
where y = ￿, u, e, and ";
E [yt+1wt+1jz(t);st+1 = 0] = E [yt+1wt+1jz(t)] ￿ ￿y;w, a constant, (9)














where y = ￿, u, and e.
Equation (8) recognizes that the means of the residuals ￿t+1, ut+1, et+1, and "t+1,
conditional on the regime at time t + 1, may di⁄er from their unconditional value
of zero. Equation (9) recognizes that the residuals ￿t+1, ut+1, et+1, and "t+1 may be
correlated. Finally, equation (10) limits the number of parameters to be estimated by
setting the second moments of the residuals ￿t+1, ut+1, and et+1, conditional on the
regime at time t + 1, equal to their unconditional value of one.
We assume that the consumer has the version of Kreps and Porteus (1978) prefer-
ences adopted by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989). These preferences allow for
a separation between the coe¢ cient of risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal























, and   > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Note that the
sign of ￿ depends on the relative magnitudes of ￿ and  . The standard time-separable
power utility is obtained as a special case when ￿ = 1, i.e. ￿ = 1
 .
6For this speci￿cation of preferences, Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) show
that, for any asset j, the ￿rst-order conditions of the consumer￿ s utility maximization
yield the following Euler equations,
E [exp(mt+1 + rj;t+1)jz(t)] = 1, (12)
mt+1 = ￿log￿ ￿
￿
 
￿ct+1 + (￿ ￿ 1)rc;t+1, (13)
where mt+1 is the natural logarithm of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution,
rj;t+1 is the continuously compounded return on asset j, and rc;t+1 is the unobservable
continuously compounded return on an asset that delivers aggregate consumption as
its dividend each period.
We rely on log-linear approximations for the log return on the consumption claim,
rc;t+1, and that on the market portfolio (the observable return on the aggregate dividend
claim), rm;t+1, as in Campbell and Shiller (1988),
rc;t+1 = ￿0 + ￿1zt+1 ￿ zt + ￿ct+1, (14)
rm;t+1 = ￿0;m + ￿1;mzm;t+1 ￿ zm;t + ￿dt+1, (15)
where zt is the log price-consumption ratio and zm;t the log price-dividend ratio. In
equation (14), ￿1 = ez
1+ez and ￿0 = log(1 + ez) ￿ ￿1z are log-linearization constants,
where z denotes the long run mean of the log price-consumption ratio. Similarly, in
equation (15), ￿1;m = ezm
1+ezm and ￿0;m = log(1 + ezm) ￿ ￿1zm, where zm denotes the
long run mean of the log price-dividend ratio.
Note that the current model speci￿cation involves two state variables, xt and pt.
We conjecture and verify the following approximate expressions for the log price-
consumption ratio and log price-dividend ratio at date t, respectively, (see Appendices
A:1 and A:2 in Constantinides and Ghosh (2009b) for derivations, expressions, and
intuition for the parameters A0(0), A1(0), A0(1), A1(1), A0;m(0), A1;m(0), A0;m(1), and
A1;m(1)):
zt = pt [A0(0) + A1(0)xt] + (1 ￿ pt)[A0(1) + A1(1)xt], (16)
zm;t = pt [A0;m(0) + A1;m(0)xt] + (1 ￿ pt)[A0;m(1) + A1;m(1)xt]. (17)
The continuously compounded risk free rate, rf;t, between periods t and t + 1, is
a function of the two latent state variables and their product (see Appendix A:3 in
Constantinides and Ghosh (2009b) for derivation and expressions for the parameters
A0;f, A1;f, A2;f, A3;f),
rf;t = A0;f + A1;fxt + A2;fpt + A3;fptxt. (18)
72.2 Predictive Implications for Returns and Growth Rates
Equations (15), (17), and (3) imply that the expected market return is given by:
E [rm;t+1jz(t)] = B0 + B1xt + B2pt + B3ptxt. (19)
Hence, from Equations (19) and (18), the expected equity premium is given by:
E [(rm;t+1 ￿ rf;t)jz(t)] = E0 + E1xt + E2pt + E3ptxt, (20)
Ei = Bi ￿ Ai;f, i = 0;1;:::;3.
The model generates time-varying expected returns and equity premium. The coef-
￿cients fBi;Eig
3
i=0 are known functions of the underlying time-series and preference
parameters. Under the assumption that the dividend growth processes of the "Small",
"Large", "Growth" and "Value" portfolios are similar to that for the market, the ex-
pected returns on these portfolios can also be shown to be a¢ ne functions of the state
variables, x and p, and their product.
The regime shifts model also has implications for the predictability of the aggregate
consumption and dividend growth rates. The time series speci￿cation of the model
implies that the expected consumption growth rate is given by




= ￿ + xt + (￿0 ￿ ￿1)￿(0)f(pt), (21)
and the expected dividend growth rate is given by




= ￿d + ￿xt + ’d (￿0 ￿ ￿1)u(0)f(pt), (22)
both linear functions of the state variables, xt and pt.
3 Data
We consider the predictive performance of the model at the annual frequency, using
annual data over the entire available sample period 1930￿2009. The asset menu con-
sists of the market return, risk free rate, and portfolios of "Value", "Growth", "Small"
capitalization, and "Large" capitalization stocks. Our market proxy is the Centre for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted index of all stocks on the NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ. The proxy for the annual real risk free rate is the in￿ ation-
adjusted rolled-over return of one-month Treasury Bills from Ibbotson Associates. The
8equity premium is the di⁄erence in average returns on the market and the risk free
rate. The construction of the size and book-to-market portfolios is as in Fama and
French (1993). In particular, for the size sort, all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks
are allocated across 10 portfolios according to their market capitalization at the end
of June of each year. Value-weighted returns on these portfolios are then computed
over the following twelve months. NYSE breakpoints are used in the sort. "Small" and
"Large" denote the bottom and top market capitalization deciles, respectively. The
size premium is the di⁄erence in average returns between the "Small" and "Large"
portfolios. Similarly, value-weighted returns are computed for portfolios formed on the
basis of BE/ME at the end of June of each year using NYSE breakpoints. The BE
used in June of year t is the book equity for the last ￿scal year end in t ￿ 1 and ME
is the price times shares outstanding at the end of December of t ￿ 1. "Growth" and
"Value" denote the bottom and top BE/ME deciles, respectively. The value premium
is the di⁄erence in average returns between the "Value" and "Growth" portfolios. An-
nual returns for the "Small", "Large", "Growth", and "Value" portfolios are computed
by compounding monthly returns within each year. The premia are computed as the
di⁄erence in the average annual returns.
Also used in the empirical analysis are the price-dividend ratio and dividend growth
rate of the market portfolio. These two time series are computed using the monthly
returns with and without dividends on the market portfolio obtained from the CRSP
￿les. The monthly dividend payments within a year are added to obtain the annual ag-
gregate dividend, i.e. we do not reinvest dividends either in T-Bills or in the aggregate
stock market.1 The annual price-dividend ratio is computed as the ratio of the price at
the end of each calender year to the annual aggregate dividends paid out during that
year.
Finally, the consumption data consists of the per capita personal consumption ex-
penditure on nondurable goods obtained from the Bureau of Economin Analysis. All
nominal quantities are converted to real, using an ARMA(1;1) forecast of the annual
in￿ ation.
4 Parameter Estimation
The parameters are estimated from the Euler equations of the market return, the
risk free rate, and the "Small", "Large", "Growth", and "Value" portfolio returns
1Koijen and Van Binsbergen (2010) consider the predictability of returns and dividend growth in
the context of a reduced-form present value model for two alternative reinvestment strategies for the
dividends: TBill-invested dividends that give a dividend growth series very similar to that used in this
paper and market-invested dividends that give rise to a highly volatile dividend growth series having
volatility about twice that for TBill-invested dividends. While the results presented in the paper are
for cash-invested dividends, very similar results are obtained for market-invested dividends and are
available from the authors on request.
9plus unconditional moments of the consumption and dividend processes, using the
GMM approach. The laggged log price-dividend ratio of the market and the risk free
rate are used as instruments. The Euler equations for the six assets along with the
chosen instruments give 18 moment restrictions. To this set of pricing restrictions,
we add 5 moment restrictions implied by the time-series speci￿cation of the model.
These moments correspond to the unconditional means and variances of aggregate
consumption and dividend growth rates and the covariance between consumption and
dividend growth rates. Thus, we have a total of 23 moment conditions. The total
number of parameters to be estimated is 21: the 3 preference parameters (￿,  , ￿); the
16 time-series parameters (￿, ￿d, ￿, ’d, ￿0, ￿1, ￿0, ￿1,￿0, ￿1, ’e, e(0), ￿(0), u(0), "(0),
￿";e); and 2 combinations of all the parameters that appear in the Euler equations.
Note that the pricing kernel is a function of the aggregate consumption growth rate
and the two latent (from the point of view of the econometrician) state variables, xt
and pt. Our estimation methodology involves inversion of two non-linear equations (17)
and (18) to express the latent state variables, xt and pt, as functions of the observables,
zm;t and rf;t. This procedure yields quadratic equations for xt and pt, with coe¢ cients
that depend on zm;t and rf;t, and the time-series and preference parameters. Solving
the equations gives two pairs of solutions for xt and pt. We report results obtained
using the bigger root of the quadratic equations as this choice minimizes the value of
the GMM criterion function.
The estimation results are reported in Table 1. The ￿rst row reports the point
estimates of the parameters along with the associated standard errors in parentheses.
The persistence parameter of the state variable, x, in the two regimes takes values
0:60 and 0:94, respectively. This suggests that in the ￿rst regime, consumption and
dividend dynamics are driven by a high frequency component that has a half-life just
over 1 year. In the second regime, x has a half-life of just over 11 years. The volatility of
x takes values 3:5% and 0:5%, respectively, in the two regimes. These ￿ndings suggest
the presence of two regimes, one in which consumption and dividend growth rates
are more persistent and less volatile and the other during which the growth rates are
much less persistent and have higher volatility. The point estimates of the transition
probabilities, ￿0 and ￿1, suggest that the duration of the regimes are 10 and 3:3 years,
respectively.
The point estimates of the subjective discount factor (0:956) and the risk aversion
coe¢ cient (12) are economically sensible. The point estimate of the IES is 0:9 and is
smaller than one. However, the standard error is 0:18 and we cannot reject values of
the IES slightly greater than one.
The table also reports the model-implied and the historical values of the equity
premium, risk free rate, size premium, and value premium. The historically observed
average level of the risk free rate is 0:9% with standard error of 0:6%. The model
generates an average risk free rate of 0:4%. The model generates an equity premium
of 10:3%, which is within the one standard error interval of the 7:9% value in the data.
10The model also generates a size premium of 4:7%, that is within the one standard error
interval of the 9:4% value in the data. Finally, the model produces a value premium of
3:8%, which is within the 95% con￿dence interval of the value 7:3% in the data
Note that the GMM estimation procedure examines the ability of the model to
simultaneously explain the pricing restrictions given by the Euler equations and the re-
strictions on the unconditional moments of aggregate consumption and dividend growth
rates implied by the time-series speci￿cation of the model. Therefore, the estimates
of the time-series and preference parameters in Table 1 are also consistent with the
time-series speci￿cation of the model. The unconditional means of consumption and
dividend growth rates are 1:5% and 1:7%, respectively, in the data. The model-implied
values of these moments are 3:4% and 6:4%, respectively. The unconditional variances
of consumption and dividend growth rates are 0:06% and 1:4%, respectively, in the
data while the model implies values of 0:18% and 3:9%, respectively. Finally, con-
sumption and dividend growth have a correlation of 0:59 in the historical sample while
the corresponding value in the model is 0:46.
Note that the market-wide log price-dividend ratio and risk free rate are approx-
imately a¢ ne functions of xt, pt, and, xtpt (equations (17) and (18), respectively).




i=0 are known functions of the underlying
time-series and preference parameters. Therefore, using the point estimates of the pa-
rameters and the time series of the price-dividend ratio and risk free rate, we extract
the time series of the state variables xt and pt and use them in the forecasting regres-
sions for returns and growth rates. This gives the following expressions for the state










a = ￿2:20 ￿ 10
￿12,





ct = 6:36rf;t ￿ 1:11zm;t + 0:94,
and
xt =
rf;t ￿ 0:052 + (2:79 ￿ 10￿14)pt
1:11 + (3:55 ￿ 10￿15)pt
. (24)
We choose the bigger root of pt (and the corresponding value of xt) as this choice
minimizes the GMM criterion function. In years when the bigger root of pt exceeds one,
we set pt = 0:99 and in years when the bigger root of pt is negative, we set pt = 0:01.
11In Figure 1, we plot the time-series of the probability that the economy is in the
￿rst regime over the period 1930￿2008. The shaded areas mark years with at least one
quarter in recession, as de￿ned by the NBER. The vertical dashed lines mark major
stock market crashes, as de￿ned in Mishkin and White (2002). The probability is a
nonlinear function of the market price-dividend ratio and risk free rate.
Figure 2 depicts the nonlinear relationship between the probability and the market-
wide price-dividend ratio and risk free rate. It is a 3-dimensional plot of the probability
of being in the ￿rst regime (z-axis) as a function of the price-dividend ratio (x-axis)
and risk free rate (y-axis) over the period 1930-2009.
5 Economic Interpretation of the Two Regimes
The point estimates of the model parameters in Table 1 imply that the ￿rst regime
has expected duration 10 years and the consumption and dividend growth dynamics
are driven by a high-frequency state variable that has half-life just over one year; while
the second regime has expected duration 3:3 years and the consumption and dividend
growth dynamics are driven by a low-frequency state variable that has half-life just over
11 years. These properties suggest that the regimes capture features of the economy
other than the business cycle.
In Table 2, we present the mean, variance, and annual autocorrelation of the divi-
dend, consumption, and GDP growth, the risk free rate, the market-wide price-dividend
ratio, the market return, and the equity, size, and value premia.2 In Panel A, we present
these summary statistics for the 54 years over the period 1931￿2008 in which the poste-
rior probability that the economy is in the ￿rst regime equals or exceeds 50%. In Panel
B, we present these summary statistics for the 24 years over the period 1931￿2008 in
which the posterior probability that the economy is in the ￿rst regime is below 50%.
Given the small size of these subsamples, the standard errors are large and di⁄erences in
the point estimates across the two regimes are often statistically insigni￿cant. However,
the di⁄erences across several macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables make a compelling
case that the two regimes are di⁄erent. The average aggregate consumption growth
rate is 1:7% (s.e. 0:5%) in the ￿rst regime whereas it is much smaller at 0:9% (s.e.
0:8%) in the second regime. The GDP growth is also higher (4:0% with s.e. 1:1%)
in the ￿rst regime than in the second regime (2:7% with s.e. 1:7%). Similarly, the
aggregate dividend growth rate is much higher at 3:8% (s.e. 1:7%) in the ￿rst regime
compared to ￿3:1% (s.e. 3:0%) in the second regime. The average risk free rate is
1:6% (s.e. 0:6%) in the ￿rst regime while it is negative 0:7% (s.e. 2:1%) in the second
2Let tj, tk, ... denote consecutive (but not necessarily adjacent) years in which the posterior
probability that the economy is in the ￿rst regime equals or exceeds 50%. The ￿rst order autocor-
relation of dividend growth in Panel A is calculated as the correlation of ￿dtj with ￿dtj+1 and not
as the correlation of ￿dtj with ￿dtk. The other autocorrelations reported in the table are calculated
accordingly.
12regime. The mean of the market-wide price-dividend ratio is slightly higher (3:50) in
the ￿rst regime compared to the second (3:08). The average market return is 9:9% (s.e.
3:1%) in the ￿rst regime and ￿1:5% (s.e. 3:7%) in the second one. The variance of the
market return is higher in the second regime than the ￿rst one. The equity premium
is also much higher at 8:3% (s.e. 2:9%) in the ￿rst regime relative to a negative 0:7%
(s.e. 4:7%) in the second regime. Most of the size premium occurs in the ￿rst regime
while the value premium is similar in the two regimes.
In Table 3, we present the results of linear regressions of the consumption growth
rate, the dividend growth rate and returns with the lagged market-wide log price-
dividend ratio as predictive variable in the two regimes. The ￿rst regime captures peri-
ods of consumption and dividend growth unpredictability and return predictability; the
second regime captures periods of consumption and dividend growth predictability and
return unpredictability. In Panel A, the aggregate consumption and dividend growth
rates are not predictable by the price-dividend ratio, having statistically insigni￿cant
coe¢ cients and small R
2
of 1:0% and ￿1:9%, respectively.3 However, returns are
strongly predictable by the price-dividend ratio. The market return and equity pre-
mium have statistically signi￿cant slope coe¢ cients and R
2
11:7% and 12:1%, respec-
tively. The price-dividend ratio also has superior predictive ability for the cross-section
of size and book-to-market-equity sorted portfolio returns with R
2
3:1%, 12:5%, 11:1%,
and 5:4%, for the "Small", "Large", "Growth", and "Value" portfolios, respectively.
The second regime captures periods of consumption and dividend growth pre-
dictability and return unpredictability. The price-dividend ratio strongly forecasts
the aggregate consumption and dividend growth rates. The slope coe¢ cients in the
predictive regressions are signi￿cantly positive and the R
2
rises from 1:0% in Panel
A to 10:5% in Panel B for the consumption growth rate and from ￿1:9% in Panel A
to 28:3% in Panel B for the dividend growth rate. The price-dividend ratio performs
poorly in predicting the market return and equity premium in this regime. The re-
gressions have statistically insigni￿cant slope coe¢ cients and R
2
two and one orders
of magnitude smaller, respectively, compared to their counterparts in Panel A. The
price-dividend ratio also performs poorly in predicting the cross-section of returns in
this regime, with the exception of the portfolio of "Small" capitalization stocks.
Taken as a whole, the results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the economy exhibits
di⁄erent characteristics across regimes. The di⁄erences in predictability across regimes
shed light on why the empirical evidence on predictability which does not explicitly
account for regime shifts is not robust in subperiods and its interpretation is contro-
versial; and why recognition of structural breaks has important implications for return
predictability (Lettau and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008), Pastor and Stambaugh (2001),
and Paye and Timmermann (2006)).
3Throughout the paper, we use R
2
to denote the adjusted R2.
136 Forecasting the Equity, Size, and Value Premia
We examine the ability of the regime shifts model to forecast the equity, size, and
value premia with regressions on the model state variables, x and p, and their product.
We compare the results with corresponding linear regressions on the market-wide price-
dividend ratio and risk free rate. In Section 6:1, we estimate the model parameters over
the period 1931 ￿ 2009, extract the time series of the state variables, and perform in-
sample forecasting regressions over the period 1931￿2009. In Section 6:2, we estimate
the model parameters over the subperiod 1931 ￿ 1975, extract the time series of the
state variables, and perform in-sample forecasting regressions over the non-overlapping
subperiod 1976 ￿ 2009. In Section 6:3, we estimate the model parameters over the
subperiod 1931 ￿ 1975, extract the time series of the state variables, and perform
out-of-sample predictive regressions over the subperiod 1976 ￿ 2009. In all cases, the
model-implied regressions outperform the regressions based on the price-dividend ratio
and risk free rate.
6.1 In-Sample Forecasting: 1931-2009
The expected equity premium implied by the model is an a¢ ne function of the two state
variables and their product (equation (20)). We estimate the model parameters over
the period 1931￿2009 and extract the time series of the state variables. We perform an
in-sample forecasting regression of the realized equity premium on the state variables
and their product. The regression coe¢ cients are marginally signi￿cant and the R
2
is 5:0% (Table 4, Panel A). The two state variables, x and p, are highly non-linear
functions of the aggregate log price-dividend ratio and risk free rate (see equations (17)
and (18)). Therefore, the expected equity premium is a highly nonlinear function of
the price-dividend ratio and risk free rate. We investigate whether this nonlinearity is
important by performing linear forecasting regressions of the realized equity premium
on the aggregate log price-dividend ratio (Row 2) and the log price-dividend ratio and
risk free rate (Row 3). The regression coe¢ cients are marginally signi￿cant and the
R
2
is 2:8% and 3:8%, respectively. This indicates that linear forecasting regressions do
not capture the highly nonlinear dependence of the expected equity premium on the
log price-dividend ratio and risk free rate.
The superior predictive performance of the model is also revealed in Figure 3, Panel
A that plots the realized equity premium (black solid line) along with its predicted
value from the forecasting regression implied by the regime shift model (green dotted
line) and a linear forecasting regression using the log market-wide price-dividend ratio
as a predictor variable (red dashed line). Note that the time series of the equity
premium predicted by the model lines up more closely with the actual realized time
series compared to the time series predicted by the price-dividend ratio. In particular,
the price-dividend ratio, unlike the state variables of the regime shift model, fails to
14account for the sharp movements in the equity premium in the historical data including
the Great Depression of the early 30s followed by a very quick recovery and the huge
run-up in asset prices in the mid-90s. To further illustrate these observations, Figure 4,
Panel B plots the cumulative squared demeaned equity premium minus the cumulative
squared regression residual from the alternative forecasting regression speci￿cations :
the predictive regression implied by the model (black solid line), and a linear predictive
regression with the log price-dividend ratio as a predictor variable (red dashed line).
An increase in a line indicates better performance of the named model relative to
the equity premium mean while a decrease in a line indicates better performance of
the equity premium mean. The ￿gure reveals the superior predictive performance of
the regime shifts model relative to the other predictor variables that is particularly
pronounced during the Great depression, World War II, and the run-up in the 90s.
Equations (23) and (24) imply that the expected equity premium in equation (20)
and the expected return of each asset class are highly nonlinear functions of the price-
dividend ratio and risk free rate. Moreover, the nonlinearity cannot be captured by
including as additional predictor variables (in addition to the price-dividend ratio and
risk free rate), the square of the price-dividend ratio, the square of the risk free rate,
or interaction terms of the price-dividend ratio and risk free rate in linear forecasting
regressions. Figure 4 plots the expected equity premium as a function of the price-
dividend ratio and risk free rate. The ￿gure reveals a highly nonlinear relationship
that cannot be captured by simple nonlinear functions of the price-dividend ratio and
risk free rate.
Moreover, the superior forecasting performance of the model is robust across sub-
periods. The model-implied state variables give an R
2
of 8:7%, when attention is
restricted to the subperiod 1976 ￿ 2009 - the period over which the most widely used
predictive variables perform poorly as noted in Welch and Goyal (2008). The price-
dividend ratio gives an R
2
of only 2:2% over this subperiod and the inclusion of the
risk free rate further lowers the R
2
to ￿1:0%.
The historical size premium (9:4%) and value premium (7:3%) are of the same order
of magnitude as the equity premium (7:9%), based on arithmetic annual returns. The
predictability of these premia is important in active portfolio management. It is also
important in providing an alternative channel to examine the empirical plausibility of
a given set of state variables that purport to explain the cross-section of returns. The
results of predictive regressions for the full sample period 1931￿2009 are presented in
Table 4.
Panel B displays results for the size premium. The ￿rst row displays results of a
regression with x, p, and their product as predictive variables. The R
2
of the regression
is 9:0%. The second row displays results of a linear regression with the market-wide
log price-dividend ratio as predictive variable. The R
2
is only 1:0% - nine times smaller
than that obtained from the model-implied regression in Row 1. Row 3 displays results
15from a linear regression with the risk free rate as an additional predictive variable. The
R
2
increases marginally to 2:8%, but is still more than three times smaller than that
obtained from the regression in Row 1.
In Panel C, the results on predicting the value premium are similar to those in
Panel B. The predictive regression with x, p, and their product as predictive variables
has R
2
3:3%. The linear regression with the lagged market-wide log price-dividend
ratio as regressor has R
2




Figure 5, Panel A (C) plots the realized size (value) premium (black solid line)
along with its predicted value from the forecasting regression implied by the regime
shift model (green dotted line) and a linear forecasting regression using the log market-
wide price-dividend ratio as a predictor variable (red dashed line). Panel B (D) plots
the cumulative squared demeaned size (value) premium minus the cumulative squared
regression residual from the alternative forecasting regression speci￿cations: the pre-
dictive regression implied by the model (black solid line), and a linear predictive re-
gression with the log price-dividend ratio as a predictor variable (green dashed line).
An increase in a line indicates better performance of the named model relative to the
portfolio mean return while a decrease in a line indicates better performance of the
mean return. The ￿gure reveals the substantially superior predictive performance of
the regime shifts model relative to the mean return that is particularly pronounced
during the Great depression and the run-up in the 90s.
Note that the results of the predictive regression of the realized equity premium on
the aggregate log price-dividend ratio and risk free rate do not support the implication
of the single-regime Bansal and Yaron (2004) model that the equity premium is an
a¢ ne function of the aggregate log price-dividend ratio and risk free rate.4
6.2 In-Sample Forecasting: 1976-2009
We reexamine the ability of the regime shifts model to forecast the equity, size, and
value premia over the subperiod 1976 ￿ 2009 for two reasons. First, it facilitates
comparison with the extant literature that documents poor in-sample (and out-of-
sample) performance of predictive models over this subperiod. Second, it allows us
to estimate the model parameters over the ￿rst subperiod 1931 ￿ 1975 and examine
the forecasting performance of the model over the non-overlapping second subperiod
4This implication of the Bansal and Yaron (2004) model follows from two observations. First,
the aggregate log price-dividend ratio and interest rate are a¢ ne functions of the two state variables
- the conditional mean of consumption growth rate and the conditional variance of its innovation.
Therefore, the two state variables are a¢ ne functions of the the aggregate log price-dividend ratio
and interest rate. Second, the equity premium is an a¢ ne function of the conditional variance of the
innovation of the consumption growth rate. Hence, the model predicts that the equity premium is an
a¢ ne function of the price-dividend ratio and interest rate.
161976 ￿ 2009. The forecasting performance of the model is even stronger over the
subperiod compared to linear forecasting regressions with the price-dividend ratio and
risk free rate as predictive variables. This demonstrates that the superior forecating
performance of the model over the full sample period 1931 ￿ 2009 is not due to the
potential look-ahead bias introduced by estimating the model parameters over the same
period over which we forecast the premia. The results are reported in Table 5.
In Panel A, we report results for the equity premium. The ￿rst row displays results
of a regression with x, p, and their product as predictive variables. The R
2
of the
regression is 7:0%. The second row displays results of a linear regression with the
market-wide log price-dividend ratio as predictive variable. The R
2
is only 2:2% - a
third of that obtained from the model-implied regression in Row 1. The inclusion of
the risk free rate lowers the R
2
further to ￿1:0%. The poor forecasting performance
of the price-dividend ratio and risk free rate over the last three decades is consistent
with the ￿ndings reported in Welch and Goyal (2008).
Panel B displays results for the size premium. The ￿rst row shows that the regres-
sion with x, p, and their product as predictive variables yields statistically signi￿cant
coe¢ cients of x and p and an R
2
of 25:9%. The second row shows that the coe¢ cient
of the price-dividend ratio is statistically insigni￿cant and the R
2
is ￿3:0%. Row 3
displays results from a linear regression with the risk free rate as an additional pre-
dictive variable. The coe¢ cient of the risk free rate is statistically signi￿cant and the
R
2
rises to 15:5% but is still much smaller than that obtained from the model-implied
regression in Row 1.
In Panel C, we report results on forecasting the value premium. The forecasting
regression with x, p, and their product as predictive variables has a statistically signi￿-
cant coe¢ cient of xp, and R
2
2:3%. The linear regression with the lagged market-wide
log price-dividend ratio as regressor has R
2
￿2:2%. The inclusion of the risk free rate
further lowers the R
2
to ￿3:2%.
Figure 6, Panel A plots the realized equity premium (black solid line) along with its
predicted value from the forecasting regression implied by the regime shift model (green
dotted line) and a linear forecasting regression using the log market-wide price-dividend
ratio as a predictor variable (red dashed line). Figure 6, Panel B plots the cumulative
squared demeaned equity premium minus the cumulative squared regression residual
from the alternative forecasting regression speci￿cations : the predictive regression
implied by the model (black solid line), and a linear predictive regression with the
log price-dividend ratio as a predictor variable (red dashed line). Figure 7 reports
analogous plots for the market return and Figure 8 for the size and value premia.
Note that the time series of the premia predicted by the model line up much more
closely with the actual realized time series compared to the time series predicted by
the price-dividend ratio.
176.3 Out-of-Sample Prediction: 1976-2009
Whereas many models that forecast the equity premium and/or market return in-
sample in certain subperiods spectacularly fail to predict out-of-sample, we demonstrate
that our model retains its predictive power out-of-sample. We examine the out-of-
sample peformance of our model forecasts in two ways.
Our ￿rst approach to examining the out-of-sample peformance of our model fore-
casts relies on the observation that the two state variables, x and p, and their product
should predict the equity premium and market return. At each year t, starting from
1975, we forecast the equity premium and market return in the year t + 1 as follows.
First, we estimate the model parameters over the period 1931 ￿ 1975 and extract the
time series of the state variables. This approach is conservative because we do not use
all the information in the history from 1931 to time t in estimating the model para-
meters. Second, we estimate the coe¢ cients of x, p, and xp from a regression over the
period 1931 to time t. Campbell and Thompson (2008) point out that the rolling out-
of-sample predictive regressions are estimated over short sample periods, particularly
at the beginning of the forecast evaluation period, and can, therefore, easily generate
perverse results, such as a negative coe¢ cient when theory suggests that the coe¢ cient
should be positive. In our out-of-sample forecast evaluation, we impose two restrictions
suggested in Campbell and Thompson (2008): a) we set the regression coe¢ cients to
zero whenever they have the ￿wrong￿sign (di⁄erent from the theoretically expected
sign estimated over the full sample), and b) we assume that investors rule out a nega-
tive equity premium or market return, and set the forecast to the zero whenever it is
negative.
The out-of-sample performance of these forecasts is evaluated using an out-of-
sample R2 statistic as in Campbell and Thompson (2008) and Welch and Goyal (2008):
R
2




where MSEA denotes the mean-squared prediction error from the predictive regres-
sion implied by the model and MSEN denotes the mean-squared prediction error of
the historical average return. If the out-of-sample R2 is positive, then the predictive
regression has lower mean-squared prediction error than the historical average return.
The results are reported in Table 6. The ￿rst row of Panel A reports the out-
of-sample results for the model-implied predictive regression for the equity premium.
The out-of-sample R2 is economically large at 5:1%. The ￿rst row of Panel B shows
that the model-implied predictive regression for the market return has an even higher
out-of-sample R2 of 10:1%.
Our second approach to examining the out-of-sample peformance of our model
forecasts uses the central insight of the model of changing economic regimes that makes
the equity premium and market return predictable by the market-wide price-dividend
ratio in the ￿rst regime but not in the second regime (see Table 3). We estimate the
18model parameters over the period 1931 ￿ 1975 and extract the time series of the state
variable, pt. At each year t+1, starting from 1975, we perform the following regression
using data for all prior years:
rm;t+1 ￿ rf;t = ￿0 + ￿1Ifpt>0:5gzm;t + ￿t+1. (26)
We use the coe¢ cient estimates to predict the equity premium for the subsequent
year. Equation (26) implies that for those time periods in which the probability of
being in the ￿rst regime, pt, is bigger than 0:5, the price-dividend ratio is used to
predict the equity premium, whereas in the time periods when pt < 0:5 the equity
premium is assumed not to be forecastable. We perform a similar regression for the
market return. As for the ￿rst approach in Row 1, we impose restrictions on the signs
of the slope coe¢ cients and on the signs of the forecasts.
The results are reported in Table 6. Row 2 of Panel A shows that the predictive
regression (26) for the equity premium gives an out-of-sample R2 of 7:3%. The results
in Panel B for the market return provide even stronger evidence in favour of the two-
regime model. The model-implied predictive regression (26) for the market return gives
a large out-of-sample R2 of 9:1%.
We compare the predictive performance of the model-implied regressions in Rows
1 and 2 to a speci￿cation that ignores the presence of regimes and performs a linear
predictive regression of the realized equity premium and market return on the lagged log
price-dividend ratio. As for the model-implied regressions in Rows 1 and 2, we impose
restrictions on the signs of the slope coe¢ cients and on the signs of the forecasts. Row
3 of Panel A shows that the linear regression model gives out-of-sample R2 of 0:2%
for the equity premium - an order of magnitude smaller that those obtained from the
model-implied regressions in Rows 1 and 2. Row 3 of Panel B shows that the log price-
dividend ratio gives an out-of-sample R2 of ￿4:6% for the market return - more than
two orders of magnitude smaller than that obtained from the model-implied predictive
regression in Row 1 and more than one order of magnitude lower than that obtained
from the model-implied regression in Row 2.
Row 4 shows that addition of the risk free rate to the linear regression model worsens
its out-of-sample predictive performance and gives negative out-of-sample R2of ￿1:6%
and ￿2:5%, respectively, for the equity premium and market return. The poor out-of-
sample predictive performance of the price-dividend ratio and risk free rate over the
last thirty years has also been reported in Welch and Goyal (2008).
Figure 9, Panel A plots the realized equity premium (black solid line) along with its
predicted value from the predictive regression (26) implied by the regime shift model
(green dotted line) and a linear predictive regression using the log market-wide price-
dividend ratio as a predictor variable (red dashed line). Figure 9, Panel B plots the
cumulative squared demeaned equity premium minus the cumulative squared regres-
sion residual from the alternative forecasting regression speci￿cations : the predictive
regression implied by the model (black solid line), and a linear predictive regression
19with the log price-dividend ratio as a predictor variable (red dashed line). Figure 10
reports analogous plots for the market return.
7 Forecasting the Variance of Market Return
We estimate the conditional variance of the annual market return as the sum of squares
of the twelve monthly log returns. In Table 7, we report the results of predictive
regressions of this conditional variance over 1931￿2009 on x, p, and their product (Row
1), the lagged aggregate log price-dividend ratio (Row 2), and the lagged aggregate log
price-dividend ratio and risk free rate (Row 3). In Row 1, the regression coe¢ cient on
xp is statistically signi￿cant and the R
2
of the regression is economically large at 6:5%.
In Rows 2 and 3, the regression coe¢ cients on the log price-dividend ratio and risk free
rate are not statistically signi￿cant and the values of R
2
are much smaller than that
in the regression of Row 1.
The superior performance of the model in forecasting the conditional variance of the
annual market return is illustrated in Figure 11 that plots the realized variance (black
solid line) along with its predicted value from the forecasting regression implied by the
regime shift model (green dotted line) and a linear forecasting regression using the log
market-wide price-dividend ratio as a predictor variable (red dashed line). Note that
the time series of the variance predicted by the model lines up more closely with the
actual realized time series compared to the time series predicted by the price-dividend
ratio. In particular, the price-dividend ratio, unlike the state variables of the regime
shift model, fails to account for the sharp movements in the variance in the historical
data including the Great Depression of the early 30s, the Oil shock in the mid 70s, and
the 1987 crash.
8 Concluding Remarks
We address the predictability of returns and of consumption and dividend growth in an
equilibrium model with two regimes. The novel state variable is the probability that the
economy is in the ￿rst regime. The economy exhibits di⁄erent characteristics across
regimes. The ￿rst regime captures periods of dividend growth unpredictability and
return predictability; while the second regime captures periods of dividend growth pre-
dictability and return unpredictability. The di⁄erences in predictability across regimes
shed light on the controversial interpretation of the extant empirical evidence on pre-
dictability and, in particular, the lack of robustness across subperiods. We show that
the model-implied state variables perform signi￿cantly better at predicting the equity,
size, and value premia and the variance of the market return over 1931 ￿ 2009 and
1976 ￿ 2009 than linear regressions with the market log price-dividend ratio and log
risk free rate as predictive variables.
20The economy exhibits other di⁄erences across regimes as well. The aggregate con-
sumption and dividend growth rates are much higher in the ￿rst regime compared to
the second. The average market return and equity premium are substantially higher
in the ￿rst regime than in the second one. The variance of the market return and
premium are higher in the second regime than in the ￿rst one. The size premium is
higher in the ￿rst regime than in the second one. The value premium exhibits reversal
in the ￿rst regime and momentum in the second one.
The ￿rst regime has expected duration 10 years and the consumption and dividend
growth dynamics are driven by a high-frequency state variable that has half-life just
over a year; while the second regime has expected duration 3:3 years and the con-
sumption and dividend growth dynamics are driven by a low-frequency state variable
that has half-life just over 11 years. These properties suggest that the regimes cap-
ture features of the economy other than the business cycle. High on our agenda is an
understanding of the economic forces that di⁄erentiate the regimes.
A related goal is the investigation on the number of regimes that are needed to
adequately describe the economy since there is no a priori reason that there should be
only two economic regimes. The challenge is the judicious increase of the number of
regimes in a model that retains computational and empirical tractability.
High also on our agenda is a uni￿ed theoretical framework that explains both the
historically observed levels of returns of di⁄erent classes of assets as well as their time
series predictability. The current paper focuses on equities but the methodology is
general and applicable to bonds, derivatives, and other asset classes.
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d
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
l
o
g
p
r
i
c
e
-
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
r
a
t
i
o
a
n
d
t
h
e
l
o
g
r
i
s
k
f
r
e
e
r
a
t
e
.
30T
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
b
e
i
n
g
i
n
t
h
e
￿
r
s
t
r
e
g
i
m
e
o
v
e
r
1
9
3
0
￿
2
0
0
8
a
l
o
n
g
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
N
B
E
R
r
e
c
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
(
s
h
a
d
e
d
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
)
a
n
d
t
h
e
m
a
j
o
r
s
t
o
c
k
m
a
r
k
e
t
c
r
a
s
h
e
s
(
v
e
r
t
i
c
a
l
d
a
s
h
e
d
l
i
n
e
s
)
i
d
e
n
t
i
￿
e
d
i
n
M
i
s
h
k
i
n
a
n
d
W
h
i
t
e
(
2
0
0
2
)
.
T
h
e
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
l
o
g
p
r
i
c
e
-
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
r
a
t
i
o
a
n
d
t
h
e
r
i
s
k
f
r
e
e
r
a
t
e
a
r
e
a
¢
n
e
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
l
y
o
f
t
h
e
t
w
o
s
t
a
t
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
a
n
d
t
h
e
i
r
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
.
H
e
n
c
e
,
w
e
c
a
n
i
n
v
e
r
t
t
h
e
s
y
s
t
e
m
t
o
e
x
t
r
a
c
t
t
h
e
t
w
o
s
t
a
t
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
a
s
k
n
o
w
n
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
t
h
e
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
b
l
e
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
l
o
g
p
r
i
c
e
-
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
r
a
t
i
o
a
n
d
r
i
s
k
f
r
e
e
r
a
t
e
.
T
h
i
s
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
o
f
i
n
v
e
r
t
i
n
g
t
w
o
n
o
n
-
l
i
n
e
a
r
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
y
i
e
l
d
s
q
u
a
d
r
a
t
i
c
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
x
t
a
n
d
p
t
,
w
i
t
h
c
o
e
¢
c
i
e
n
t
s
t
h
a
t
d
e
p
e
n
d
o
n
z
m
;
t
a
n
d
r
f
;
t
,
a
n
d
t
h
e
t
i
m
e
-
s
e
r
i
e
s
a
n
d
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
p
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
s
.
S
o
l
v
i
n
g
t
h
e
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
g
i
v
e
s
t
w
o
p
a
i
r
s
o
f
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
x
t
a
n
d
p
t
a
s
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
t
h
e
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
b
l
e
s
,
z
m
;
t
a
n
d
r
f
;
t
.
W
e
c
h
o
o
s
e
t
h
e
b
i
g
g
e
r
r
o
o
t
a
s
t
h
i
s
m
i
n
i
m
i
z
e
s
t
h
e
G
M
M
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
o
n
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
.
31F
i
g
u
r
e
2
:
T
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
d
e
p
i
c
t
s
t
h
e
n
o
n
l
i
n
e
a
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
b
e
i
n
g
i
n
t
h
e
￿
r
s
t
r
e
g
i
m
e
a
n
d
t
h
e
m
a
r
k
e
t
-
w
i
d
e
p
r
i
c
e
-
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
r
a
t
i
o
a
n
d
r
i
s
k
f
r
e
e
r
a
t
e
.
I
t
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
z
-
a
x
i
s
32F
i
g
u
r
e
3
:
P
a
n
e
l
A
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
r
e
a
l
i
z
e
d
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
a
l
o
n
g
w
i
t
h
i
t
s
m
o
d
e
l
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
o
v
e
r
1
9
3
1
-
2
0
0
9
.
P
a
n
e
l
B
s
h
o
w
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
n
-
s
a
m
p
l
e
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
o
f
t
h
e
m
o
d
e
l
-
i
m
p
l
i
e
d
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
v
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
(
R
S
M
)
a
s
w
e
l
l
a
s
a
l
i
n
e
a
r
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
t
h
a
t
u
s
e
s
t
h
e
l
a
g
g
e
d
l
o
g
p
r
i
c
e
-
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
r
a
t
i
o
a
s
a
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
o
r
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
L
M
)
f
o
r
t
h
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
.
T
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
"
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
S
S
E
D
i
⁄
e
r
e
n
c
e
"
d
e
￿
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
d
e
m
e
a
n
e
d
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
R
S
M
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
.
I
t
a
l
s
o
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
d
e
m
e
a
n
e
d
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
L
M
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
.
33F
i
g
u
r
e
4
:
T
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
d
e
p
i
c
t
s
t
h
e
n
o
n
l
i
n
e
a
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
-
m
i
u
m
a
n
d
t
h
e
m
a
r
k
e
t
-
w
i
d
e
p
r
i
c
e
-
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
r
a
t
i
o
a
n
d
r
i
s
k
f
r
e
e
r
a
t
e
.
34F
i
g
u
r
e
5
:
P
a
n
e
l
A
(
C
)
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
r
e
a
l
i
z
e
d
s
i
z
e
(
v
a
l
u
e
)
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
a
l
o
n
g
w
i
t
h
i
t
s
m
o
d
e
l
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
o
v
e
r
1
9
3
1
-
2
0
0
9
.
T
h
e
m
o
d
e
l
i
m
p
l
i
e
s
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
s
i
z
e
a
n
d
v
a
l
u
e
p
r
e
m
i
a
a
r
e
a
¢
n
e
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
t
h
e
t
w
o
s
t
a
t
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
,
x
a
n
d
p
,
a
n
d
t
h
e
i
r
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
,
x
p
.
P
a
n
e
l
B
(
D
)
s
h
o
w
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
n
-
s
a
m
p
l
e
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
o
f
t
h
e
m
o
d
e
l
-
i
m
p
l
i
e
d
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
v
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
(
R
S
M
)
a
s
w
e
l
l
a
s
a
l
i
n
e
a
r
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
t
h
a
t
u
s
e
s
t
h
e
l
a
g
g
e
d
l
o
g
p
r
i
c
e
-
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
r
a
t
i
o
a
s
a
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
o
r
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
L
M
)
f
o
r
t
h
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
.
T
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
"
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
S
S
E
D
i
⁄
e
r
e
n
c
e
"
d
e
￿
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
d
e
m
e
a
n
e
d
s
i
z
e
(
v
a
l
u
e
)
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
R
S
M
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
.
I
t
a
l
s
o
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
d
e
m
e
a
n
e
d
s
i
z
e
(
v
a
l
u
e
)
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
L
M
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
.
35F
i
g
u
r
e
6
:
P
a
n
e
l
A
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
r
e
a
l
i
z
e
d
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
a
l
o
n
g
w
i
t
h
i
t
s
m
o
d
e
l
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
o
v
e
r
1
9
7
6
-
2
0
0
9
.
P
a
n
e
l
B
s
h
o
w
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
n
-
s
a
m
p
l
e
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
o
f
t
h
e
m
o
d
e
l
-
i
m
p
l
i
e
d
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
v
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
(
R
S
M
)
a
s
w
e
l
l
a
s
a
l
i
n
e
a
r
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
t
h
a
t
u
s
e
s
t
h
e
l
a
g
g
e
d
l
o
g
p
r
i
c
e
-
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
r
a
t
i
o
a
s
a
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
o
r
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
L
M
)
f
o
r
t
h
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
.
T
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
"
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
S
S
E
D
i
⁄
e
r
e
n
c
e
"
d
e
￿
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
d
e
m
e
a
n
e
d
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
R
S
M
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
.
I
t
a
l
s
o
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
d
e
m
e
a
n
e
d
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
L
M
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
.
36F
i
g
u
r
e
7
:
P
a
n
e
l
A
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
r
e
a
l
i
z
e
d
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
t
u
r
n
a
l
o
n
g
w
i
t
h
i
t
s
m
o
d
e
l
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
o
v
e
r
1
9
7
6
-
2
0
0
9
.
P
a
n
e
l
B
s
h
o
w
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
n
-
s
a
m
p
l
e
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
o
f
t
h
e
m
o
d
e
l
-
i
m
p
l
i
e
d
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
v
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
(
R
S
M
)
a
s
w
e
l
l
a
s
a
l
i
n
e
a
r
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
t
h
a
t
u
s
e
s
t
h
e
l
a
g
g
e
d
l
o
g
p
r
i
c
e
-
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
r
a
t
i
o
a
s
a
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
o
r
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
L
M
)
f
o
r
t
h
e
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
t
u
r
n
.
T
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
"
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
S
S
E
D
i
⁄
e
r
e
n
c
e
"
d
e
￿
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
d
e
m
e
a
n
e
d
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
t
u
r
n
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
R
S
M
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
.
I
t
a
l
s
o
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
d
e
m
e
a
n
e
d
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
t
u
r
n
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
L
M
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
.
37F
i
g
u
r
e
8
s
h
o
w
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
n
-
s
a
m
p
l
e
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
o
f
t
h
e
m
o
d
e
l
-
i
m
p
l
i
e
d
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
v
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
-
s
i
o
n
f
o
r
t
h
e
s
i
z
e
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
a
n
d
v
a
l
u
e
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
s
u
b
p
e
r
i
o
d
1
9
7
6
-
2
0
0
9
.
T
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
"
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
S
S
E
D
i
⁄
e
r
e
n
c
e
"
i
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
d
e
m
e
a
n
e
d
p
o
r
t
f
o
l
i
o
r
e
t
u
r
n
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
m
o
d
e
l
-
i
m
p
l
i
e
d
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
.
I
n
o
t
h
e
r
w
o
r
d
s
,
i
t
i
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
-
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
e
r
r
o
r
o
f
t
h
e
h
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
m
e
a
n
r
e
t
u
r
n
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
e
r
r
o
r
o
f
t
h
e
r
e
g
i
m
e
s
h
i
f
t
m
o
d
e
l
.
38F
i
g
u
r
e
9
:
P
a
n
e
l
A
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
r
e
a
l
i
z
e
d
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
a
l
o
n
g
w
i
t
h
i
t
s
o
u
t
-
o
f
-
s
a
m
p
l
e
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
o
v
e
r
1
9
7
6
-
2
0
0
9
.
P
a
n
e
l
B
s
h
o
w
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
o
u
t
o
f
-
s
a
m
p
l
e
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
o
f
t
h
e
m
o
d
e
l
-
i
m
p
l
i
e
d
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
v
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
(
R
S
M
)
a
s
w
e
l
l
a
s
a
l
i
n
e
a
r
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
t
h
a
t
u
s
e
s
t
h
e
l
a
g
g
e
d
l
o
g
p
r
i
c
e
-
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
r
a
t
i
o
a
s
a
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
o
r
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
L
M
)
f
o
r
t
h
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
.
T
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
"
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
S
S
E
D
i
⁄
e
r
e
n
c
e
"
d
e
￿
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
d
e
m
e
a
n
e
d
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
R
S
M
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
.
I
t
a
l
s
o
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
d
e
m
e
a
n
e
d
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
L
M
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
.
39F
i
g
u
r
e
1
0
:
P
a
n
e
l
A
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
r
e
a
l
i
z
e
d
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
t
u
r
n
a
l
o
n
g
w
i
t
h
i
t
s
o
u
t
-
o
f
-
s
a
m
p
l
e
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
o
v
e
r
1
9
7
6
-
2
0
0
9
.
P
a
n
e
l
B
s
h
o
w
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
o
u
t
-
o
f
-
s
a
m
p
l
e
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
o
f
t
h
e
m
o
d
e
l
-
i
m
p
l
i
e
d
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
v
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
(
R
S
M
)
a
s
w
e
l
l
a
s
a
l
i
n
e
a
r
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
t
h
a
t
u
s
e
s
t
h
e
l
a
g
g
e
d
l
o
g
p
r
i
c
e
-
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
r
a
t
i
o
a
s
a
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
o
r
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
L
M
)
f
o
r
t
h
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
.
T
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
"
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
S
S
E
D
i
⁄
e
r
e
n
c
e
"
d
e
￿
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
d
e
m
e
a
n
e
d
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
t
u
r
n
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
R
S
M
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
.
I
t
a
l
s
o
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
d
e
m
e
a
n
e
d
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
t
u
r
n
m
i
n
u
s
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
L
M
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
.
40F
i
g
u
r
e
1
1
:
T
h
e
￿
g
u
r
e
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
r
e
a
l
i
z
e
d
m
a
r
k
e
t
v
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
a
l
o
n
g
w
i
t
h
i
t
s
m
o
d
e
l
-
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
o
v
e
r
1
9
3
1
￿
2
0
0
9
.
T
h
e
b
l
a
c
k
s
o
l
i
d
l
i
n
e
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
r
e
a
l
i
z
e
d
v
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
t
h
a
t
i
s
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
s
u
m
o
f
s
q
u
a
r
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
l
o
g
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
.
T
h
e
g
r
e
e
n
d
o
t
t
e
d
l
i
n
e
p
l
o
t
s
t
h
e
m
o
d
e
l
-
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
v
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
a
n
d
i
s
o
b
t
a
i
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
￿
t
t
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
f
r
o
m
a
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
r
e
a
l
i
z
e
d
v
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
o
n
t
h
e
t
w
o
s
t
a
t
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
a
n
d
t
h
e
i
r
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
.
T
h
e
r
e
d
d
a
s
h
e
d
l
i
n
e
s
h
o
w
s
t
h
e
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
v
e
p
o
w
e
r
o
f
t
h
e
l
o
g
p
r
i
c
e
-
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
r
a
t
i
o
f
o
r
t
h
e
f
u
t
u
r
e
v
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
b
y
p
l
o
t
t
i
n
g
t
h
e
￿
t
t
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
f
r
o
m
a
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
r
e
a
l
i
z
e
d
v
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
o
n
t
h
e
l
a
g
g
e
d
l
o
g
p
r
i
c
e
-
d
i
v
i
d
e
n
d
r
a
t
i
o
.
41